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"STATUTORY" AND "HORTATORY" PROVISIONS OF
THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION OF 1974
Lee Hargrave*
During the campaign to adopt the 1974 constitution, much was
made of the fact that the drafters had reduced the number of words
in the constitution from 255,500 to under 35,000.' This reduction of
words and the elimination of detailed provisions was no small
accomplishment, and it was not achieved without difficulty. Never-
theless, the 1974 constitution is still too long and detailed. It is in-
teresting to speculate as to why this is so-why the "good govern-
ment" forces that in another state would be supporting flexibility in
the legislature are instead wanting to freeze their "reforms" in the
constitution to protect them from legislative "tampering." For exam-
ple, the experience during the pro-Long/anti-Long political divisions,
in which an Earl Long-dominated legislature repealed the statutory
civil service reform that had been adopted during the Sam Jones
governorship, is the oft-cited reason why the details of a civil service
system remain in the state's constitution.2
One also can speculate as to why the convention adopted so many
unnecessary" constitutional provisions that are without binding effect
or are worded simply to encourage action rather than to command
it or that ultimately give the legislature the discretion to act as it
chooses. The purpose of this article-to select a number of these
statutory and hortatory provisions and discuss their construction and
application-is more concrete.
Of course, a complete catalogue and explanation of these provi-
sions would result in an article longer than the 1921 constitution.
Hence, the following provisions, which appear to invite litigation, were
selected:
Sovereign Immunity and Enforcement of Judgments
Forced Heirship and Trusts
Property Related Provisions
Limits on Local and Special Laws
Retirement Benefits
Gambling and Lotteries
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
ARTICLE XII, SECTION 10
Immunity From Suit
Article XII, section 10(A) is a curious provision. It neither asserts
nor denies the existence of a general sovereign immunity doctrine,
but simply states that governmental agencies shall not be immune
from suit "in contract or for injury to person or property." The sec-
tion is thus only a small part, albeit one with tremendous financial
impact, of the overall collection of rules in this area of the law. An
understanding of the section requires an inquiry into both the state
of the law at the time of the adoption of the constitution and the
complex political process3 by which the section was put together. A
literal textual approach might suggest that the specific waiver of im-
munity in contract and tort implies a prohibition of all other types
of suits unless the sovereign consents. Unfortunately, the matter is
not that simple."
No Louisiana constitution has ever provided that the state is im-
mune from suit. The courts adopted a version of sovereign immunity,
and the reaction was to provide in the state's constitutions a pro-
cedure for the state to waive its immunity and provide for enforce-
ment of judgments against it.' Even now, there is no constitutional
foundation to support a claim of general immunity from suit, and there
are many areas in which it has never been questioned that the state
is subject to suit.
3. The Baton Rouge State Times reported that the debate on sovereign immuni-
ty consumed more than five hours on July 26, 1973, with the group failing to reach
accord on a proposal. Dickinson, Suits Against State Spark CC 73 Debate, State Times
(Baton Rouge), July 27, 1973, at 1-A, col. 3.
4. One of the problems of the opinion in Two O'Clock Bayou Land Co. v. State
of La., 415 So. 2d 990 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), is its use of this rather simplistic analysis.
5. See generally Board of Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping & Enters. Co., 273 So.
2d 19 (La. 1973); City of Natchitoches v. State, 221 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969);
Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REV. 476
(1953).
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The ability to sue the state in some areas is crucial to judicial
review and enforcement of bill of rights guarantees. If the state simply
invaded or took over a tract of land owned by a private individual,
it would be violating the constitutional provision against takings
without due process, and to forbid the landowner from suing for just
compensation would be to negate the constitutional guarantee. In this
regard, "it has been established that where private property has been
appropriated by the state 'for public purposes,' the right of the owner
to recover adequate compensation will be entertained by the courts
as an exception to the principle that the sovereign cannot be sued
without its consent."' Similarly, when riparian landowners are entitled
to payment for land taken or destroyed for levee construction, their
right would be virtually abrogated if they were not able to assert
it against the state.' This development with respect to expropriation
is just one application of the general principle that protection of con-
stitutional rights often requires that citizens be allowed to sue the
state.' While one can debate the breadth of it, the principle clearly
exists, and nothing in the development of section 10(A) supports its
abolition. The convention was working on this existing state of af-
fairs and was seeking to expand the right to sue to new areas, rather
than to limit it more than prior case law had done. Even beyond con-
stitutional rights, many statutory rights have been enforced by man-
damus, quo warranto, or other proceedings against individuals
representing the state. and acting for the state. In those instances,
the legality of state action and legislation has been and can continue
to be contested.9 Sovereign immunity was to no avail when city of-
ficials sued the state and some state officials for declaratory and in-
junctive relief against threatened enforcement of criminal sanctions.
No waiver was required because the law "only requires waiver of im-
6. Bernard v. State of La., 127 So. 2d 774, 777 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961). See Dupree
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 238 La. 166, 114 So. 2d 594 (1959); Angelle v. State, 212 La.
1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (1948).
7. Cf. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896).
8. See McCoy v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 345 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1965). "For
the second time in this case and for the seventh time in recent years, we hold that
a state agency is not immune from suit to enjoin it from enforcing an unconstitutional
statute." Id. at 721. Although this is a federal court case, the same principle should
apply in state courts applying federal constitutional rights. In that regard, it would be
anomalous for a state constitution that expanded the state Bill of Rights also to be
construed to have deprived the state's citizens of the ability to enforce those rights
in state courts.
9. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 3861-3866, 3901. In Bussie v. Long, 257 La. 623, 243 So.
2d 776 (1971), the supreme court recognized that the assessment practices of the state
tax commission could be tested in a class action by taxpayers against the Louisiana
Tax Commission and its individual members. At issue were state statutes requiring
assessment at cash value and constitutional rights of equal protection.
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munity where the liability sought to be enforced is historically im-
mune from suit without legislative consent under the judicially-created
doctrines recognizing the immunity (which commonly involves torts
committed by governmental officers in the performance of purely
governmental functions)."' School boards, which were ordinarily im-
mune from suits by citizens, were not immune from suits by other
school boards involving disputes over sixteenth section lands." Various
devices, such as the nonstatutory action instituted against the state
mineral board to remove cloud from title, have been used to func-
tionally test the state's ownership of land and water bottoms. 2 Indeed,
the celebrated cases of Miami Corp. v. State,'" State v. Irwin," and
Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. State Mineral Board," familiar to any
freshman property student, have inculcated the tradition that such
litigation with the state over property ownership is the norm. Dur-
ing the convention debate on sovereign immunity, Delegate Triche
referred to these cases and suggested that there be no immunity in
such title disputes."6
In short, the convention did not adopt broad sovereign immunity
in all suits, but it did assume that sovereign immunity existed in some
areas. These areas were never defined. The author of the final com-
promise provision that became section 10(A) indicated that he did not
know what other categories of suits would not be allowed, suggesting
that such issues would be left to court development.'7 Court develop-
ment could continue in the approach of Board of Commissioners v.
Splendour Shipping & Enterprises Co. 8, recognizing judicial flexibili-
ty where neither the constitution nor a statute compelled certain
results. In other words, the trend in the courts to abolish sovereign
immunity in more areas still could continue.
One might wonder why the convention did not clearly abrogate
all sovereign immunity. The simple answer is that there were not
10. City of Natchitoches v. State, 221 So. 2d 534, 539 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
11. Terrebonne Parish School Bd. v. St. Mary Parish School Bd., 131 So. 2d 266
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1961), ajfd, 138 So. 2d 104 (La. 1962).
12. Note, Mineral Rights-Title Controversies With the State and Its Agencies-
Sovereign Immunity From Suit, 27 LA. L. REV. 124 (1966).
13. 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936).
14. 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931).
15. 203 La. 473, 14 So. 2d 61 (1943).
16. V RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, July 27, 1973 at 431. To the extent that
Two O'Clock Bayou Land Co. v. State of La., 415 So. 2d 990 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982),
rests on convention transcript argument to the contrary, its argument is incomplete
and not a fair reflection of the debate.
17. V RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, July 27, 1973 at 431.
18. 273 So. 2d 19 (La. 1973).
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enough votes to do so-attempts to do so were rejected." Aside from
general ideological views about individual rights versus attacks on
public treasuries, ° the debate does disclose from Delegate Kean a
statement that if sovereign immunity were abolished, it would have
a spillover effect and perhaps abolish the immunity of public officials-
judicial, legislative, and executive-for responsibility for their official
conduct." This concern, expressed by a respected delegate, furnished
a logical basis that may have swayed a few votes in the closely divided
body to choose instead to enumerate the kinds of suits in which there
clearly was to be an abolition of immunity. The concern of most of
the proponents was with damage awards in tort and contract, and
it was those concerns that were listed. Overall elegance of drafting
was put aside in favor of a pragmatic political solution.
The result of this process is that three categories of suits related
to sovereign immunity now exist: (1) suits which would have been
allowed without obtaining consent of the state, (2) suits in contract
and for injury to person or property which are clearly allowed without
obtaining consent to sue, and (3) suits that don't fit (1) or (2) above
and for which consent to sue are required. Distinguishing between
the three categories is less than simple, and since the debate focused
on such a small part of the overall problem (tort damages), it fails
to give much guidance as to making these distinctions. A reference
forbidding private landowners to claim the state capitol under old land
grants might be an indication of the view that petitory actions are
not allowed, although the reference is directed more to the issue of
execution of judgments than to allowing suit. In addition, the debate
included other approving references to Miami and Amerada Petroleum
where title to property claimed by the state was litigated."
In any event, the provision represents an expansion of the right
to sue governments, an expansion in accord with prior judicial policy.
All of this would suggest an approach that gives the widest possible
ambit to the rights of individuals to sue their governments, thus en-
tailing a broad construction of the meaning of "contract" and "injury
to person or property." This is especially so because the enforcement
of judgments is still strictly limited by section 10(C), even if one
19. Proposals to abolish all immunity failed by votes of 49-65, 46-56, 43-57. An
initial proposal to eliminate immunity for torts failed by only 50-51. The final proposal
was adopted by a 59-50 vote. V RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, July 26, 1973 at
408, 412, 419; Id., July 27, 1973 at 433.
20. The record is replete with references to "the rape of the state of Louisiana."
V RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, July 26, 1973 at 403.
21. V RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, July 27, 1973 at 427.
22. Id. at 431.
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obtains a money judgment against the state. The public fisc is more
than adequately protected by that latter section.
Another basic fact is that the suits in category (3), in which con-
sent to sue is needed, primarily will concern the governmental units
in their private rather than their public capacities. In the former
(private capacity), constitutional guarantees and mandamus suits
against individuals will usually provide for the litigation without the
need for consent. It is in the capacity as landowner and private
manager that most suits will arise. Presumably, operating a facility
in violation of Civil Code article 667 or article 2315 would result in
damage to property and be the basis for a suit. However, if there
is no such damage and no constitutional guarantee involved, consent
would be needed. Nonetheless, this category of cases would be quite
small, for damage to property could include small diminutions in value
and damage to person could include mental distress.
Indeed, if one were to conclude that a petitory action was pre-
cluded, the fact that a state agent was using the property or depleting
it by producing oil and gas would be the basis for an assertion of
damage to property and the basis for supporting the suit without con-
sent. This suit would ultimately have to involve the underlying title
question.
In any event, the tone of the foregoing discussion and the minute
distinctions involved there further reinforce the view that a broad
construction of the article would serve the aim of simplicity as well
as the policy factors discussed earlier.23
Immunity from Liability
Section 10(A) also provides that there shall be no governmental
immunity from liability in contract or for injury to person or prop-
erty. A distinction in the past allowed the immunity from suit but
not immunity from liability to be waived. The distinction caused
difficulty,"4 and the solution in a 1960 constitutional amendment was
to indicate with certainty that a state waiver of immunity also pro-
vided for a waiver of the state's liability.25 The new provision con-
tinues the language of this amendment in both 10(A) and 10(B),
paragraph (A) providing the automatic waiver for contract suits and
actions involving damage to person or property and paragraph (B) pro-
23. The supreme court seems to be taking this approach. See Darville v. Associated
Indem. Corp.,323 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
24. See McMahon & Miller, The Crain Myth-A Criticism of the Duree and Stephens
Cases, 20 LA. L. REV. 449 (1960).
25. See 1960 La. Acts, No. 621, S 1 (proposing the amendment that became art.
3, S 35 of the constitution of 1921).
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viding that a legislative waiver shall waive both immunity from suit
and liability. Thus, whenever private citizens would be liable for cer-
tain conduct causing damage to person or property, the state and its
agencies and political subdivisions also shall be liable for similar
conduct."6
This provision, however, does not upset the immunity that might
exist for certain officials of the state, its agencies, or of other govern-
mental units.27
Enforcement of Judgments
The apparent liberality of abolishing most immunity from suit was
offset by the continuation of a severe limitation on a private citizen's
ability to enforce a judgment against the state, a state agency, or
a local governmental entity. Article XII, section 10(C), while allowing
the legislature to establish a procedure for suits against governmen-
tal units and to provide for "the effect of a judgment" in such cases,
makes it clear that under such laws, "no public property or public
funds shall be subject to seizure." Also, no money judgments against
these units shall be "exigible, payable, or paid except from funds ap-
propriated therefor by the legislature or by the political subdivision
against which judgment is rendered."
Before some typical Louisiana constitutional tinkering, the ability
to seize government-owned property was regulated by Civil Code prin-
ciples. Things owned by government in its public capacity were exempt
from seizure, whereas things owned by such units in their private
domain were subject to be seized.28 While the intricacies separating
the public and private domain of governmental entities led to some
nice games (municipal water system machinery parts were in the
public domain),' the principle was at least well established. A 1960
constitutional amendment broadened the protection against seizure;
it provided that no judgment "against the state or any other public
body shall be exigible, payable or paid except out of funds ap-
propriated for payment therefor.""6 The 1974 constitution tracks that
26. Jones v. City of Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980); Segura v. Louisiana
Architects Selection Bd., 362 So. 2d 498 (La. 1978); Murchison, The Work of the Loui-
siana Appellate Courts for the'1978-1979 Term-Local Government Law, 40 LA. L. REV.
681, 712-15 (1980).
27. See V RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, July 27, 1973 at 431.
28. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY S 34 in 2 LoUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 95-98
(2d ed. 1980). See also the corresponding discussion in the first edition, discussing the
law applicable before the 1978 revision of the Civil Code property articles. A. YIAN.
NOPOULOS, PROPERTY SS 38-39 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 121-28 (1967).
29. Town of Farmerville v. Commercial Credit Co., 173 La. 43, 136 So. 82 (1931).
30. 1960 La. Acts, No. 621 (adopted as LA. CONST. of 1921, art. 3, S 35). The com-
mittee proposal governing suits against the state would have provided nothing about
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language and applies the rule to all public entities, making it clear
that no government property or funds shall be subject to seizure, even
if held by the governmental units in their private capacities.
The purpose of the constitutional provision was recognized in
Foreman v. Vermilion Parish Police Jury,' which held that a judg-
ment against a police jury was not enforceable by seizure of the farm
land it owned, even if that land was in the police jury's private domain.
Such results are not particularly just or pleasing, but they seem to
be compelled. What Delegate Kelly called a "true compromise" in
reaching adoption of article XII, section 10 was to allow the suits,
but to limit the means of enforcement of judgments in these actions.
Although the court of appeal in Fontenot v. State Department of
Highways" was correct in stating that the courts have no power to
compel a police jury to appropriate funds to pay a judgment, this fact
should not necessarily relieve the police jury from having to submit
to a judgment debtor examination under article 2451 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. This provision allows a judgment creditor to "examine
the judgment debtor, his books, papers or documents, upon any mat-
ter relating to his property." Such an order does not violate section
10(C), for it does not order an appropriation and thus is allowed.'
The information is relevant to establishing the ability of the govern-
mental defendant to pay and the reasons for failing to pay. Also such
information is relevant and related to possible equal protection and
due process claims.
The text of section 10(C) and the debate which produced it display
a concern with damage awards against governmental agencies that
result in judgments ordering payment of money. Little attention was
given to other kinds of judgments, and the sole possible reference
in 10(C) to such other judgments is the general provision that the
legislature "shall provide for the effect of a judgment." What then
of judgments that do other than award money, such as injunctions,
declaratory judgments, and orders to bring petitory actions as part
enforcement of judgments; it was open for the legislature to so provide. However,
the amendments to abolish sovereign immunity also generally included a provision
protecting public property from seizure. Those combined amendments were not adopted
during the long debate, but a simple amendment by Delegate Lanier adopting the
basic 1960 language was adopted and then continued into the final compromise. V
RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, July 27, 1973 at 420.
31. 336 So. 2d 986 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
32. 358 So. 2d 981 (La. App. 1st Cir.), rev'd, 355 So. 2d 1324 (La. 1978). The supreme
court opinion was printed prior to the appellate court opinion.
33. Fontenot v. State Dep't of Highways, 355 So. 2d 1324 (La. 1978). Cf. Murchison,
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Local Government
Law, 39 LA. L. REV. 843, 870 (1979) (where the author sees no relevant use for the infor-
mation that would be provided).
[Vol. 43
LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION OF 1974
of judgments in possessory actions? In the absence of specific legisla-
tion, the general laws on the subject would seem to be in force.
For example, if the plaintiff in a possessory action against the
state proved his possession, the judgment would maintain the plain-
tiff in that possession and order the state to file a petitory action
within a stated time or be precluded from doing so. If a private plain-
tiff in a petitory action against the state succeeded in proving good
title, that title would be recognized and the state would be ordered
to cease acts of possession on the property. If, as part of the title
litigation, it were found that the state had taken fruits or products
to which it was not entitled, the money judgment providing for com-
pensation to the true owner for those wrongs would not be enforceable
through seizure of public property, but would have to await an
appropriation. However, if the private landowner elected to keep some
state-made improvements and thus was required to compensate the
state for its expenses or for the value of the improvements, that
amount could be set off by whatever amounts the state owed the
private landowner for taking fruits or products. Such a set-off would
not need to be enforced by seizure of public property and would not
depend on an appropriation.
If a declaratory judgment were rendered, there would be nothing
to enforce-the judgment would simply have its declaratory effect.
If later relief were requested, means of enforcement other than seizure
of public property could be undertaken. Injunctions are not prohibited
if the court does not order the payment of money. As long as no
statute, such as the antitax injunction legislation, prohibits a certain
type of injunction, this remedy is available against the state or govern-
mental unit.
In effect, section 10(C) is aimed at protecting the public fisc and
seeks to avoid governmental priorities being upset by the payment
of substantial money judgments. It is not aimed at limiting the courts
in a general manner in dealing with the state. Certainly, the attitude
of the constitutional convention was to enlarge and protect individual
rights, not to limit them. To interpret section 10(C) as some general
prohibition against enforcement of judgments against the state would
be inconsistent with that policy and would threaten the reach of
judicial review, a review that was increased and strengthened during
the convention.' Of course, the section also allows the legislature to
enact legislation with respect to enforcement of judgments of all kinds
against the state. Such legislation is valid if it comports with due pro-
34. See Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
35 LA. L. REV. 1, 60 (1974); Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974, 37 LA. L. REV. 765, 794-806 (1977).
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cess and equal protection and does not otherwise contravene some
constitutional guarantees.
Legislation has been adopted to provide a procedure for payment
of small judgments against the state and to provide for settlement
of some claims against the state. 5 In addition, the state has an ex-
cellent record of appropriating funds to pay judgments rendered
against it. The problems that have arisen in collecting money
judgments involve payment of judgments by municipalities and parish
governing authorities. No legislation exists to force them to pay their
judgments, although pressure from the legislature to cut off various
state funds if judgments are not paid has been successfully applied
in the past to force governmental subdivisions to pay their judgments.3 1
It is clear that section 10(C) does not require the state to pay
judgments rendered against local government subdivisions, although
it is also clear that the state could adopt legislation so providing or
otherwise providing coercive measures to force local governments to
pay judgments. In the absence of such legislation, there remains a
serious problem with some local government units refusing to pay
unpopular judgments, particularly judgments awarding substantial
damages for negligence in constructing and maintaining public roads. 7
In the absence of legislation, the basic remedy is the use of threats
from the state government-if the legislature is willing to use them.
Other alternatives for ordering payment of judgments against the
state or its local subdivisions could come from the declaration of rights
of the constitution, especially the equal protection guarantee. The Loui-
siana Constitution prohibits all discrimination based on race, religion,
or political views; failure to pay judgments based on these classifica-
tions undoubtedly would be unsupported by any adequate basis. The
remedy of injunction or declaratory judgment would be available for
such violations, but a problem would arise with respect to granting
relief in the form of a money judgment. It might be possible, by argu-
ing that section 10(C) must be read in conjunction with other con-
stitutional guarantees, to carve out an exception to section 10(C) for
violations of constitutional rights and to order seizure or appropria-
tions in these cases." If the courts are unwilling to do this the private
35. LA. R.S. 13:5141-5157 (Supp. 1977).
36. E.g., Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge), July 8, 1978, at 15-A, col. 1; Pursnell,
Ascension Parish Police Jury Won't Pay Judgment in Death, Morning Advocate (Baton
Rouge), July 7, 1978, at 7-C, col. 4.
37. E.g., Penalber v. Blount, 405 So. 2d 1378 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
38. See Penalber v. Blount, 407 So. 2d 1189 (La. 1981) (Lemmon, J., concurring
in the denial of a writ). "However, this action should not be taken as approving the
appellate court's implicit holding that a judgment creditor cannot petition the court
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litigant's alternative is to pursue a federal court action based on denial
of United States constitutional rights and recover under federal civil
rights statutes.' Since that federal remedy would be available in any
event, with the power to enforce by seizure," this is further reason
for the state to carve out an exception to section 10(C) for violations
of equal protection.
More realistic, however, are failures to pay judgments based on
classifications that are not as suspect as race, religion, or political
affiliation. More probable is failure to pay judgments of plaintiffs who
live outside the defendant's jurisdiction (and thus do not vote for the
officials involved) while paying judgments of plaintiffs who do reside
within the jurisdiction. Such a discrimination would appear to be
without rational basis and might also run afoul of the first amend-
ment, the dormant commerce clause, and the equal protection clause.
Again, the state and federal equal protection guarantees ought to be
adequate bases for judgment against the political unit involved. Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, of course, there would also be room for personal
liability of the members of the governing authority participating in
the denial of federal constitutional rights.
This equal protection approach would not succeed, however, when
there is a rational basis to support the classification and the classifica-
tion involved does not invoke a high level of scrutiny. Within these
lower scrutiny tests are matters related to finances. It would thus
appear that a classification based on the amount of judgment would
not be a denial of equal protection. If a municipality facing judgments
it could not totally cover paid a uniform percentage of all judgments
outstanding, the reasonableness criteria probably would be met. The
development of some standard scale of paying graduated portions of
judgments, the percentage of payment decreasing as the amount in-
creases, ought to be permissible also. Indeed, limits on the total
amounts payable per person may well meet the reasonableness stan-
dard of the equal protection guarantee if there are not sufficient funds
to pay all judgments and still conduct a basic level of municipal
services.
to compel a political subdivision to take action on the appropriation of funds for pay-
ment of a judgment."- Id. Also see the problems raised by Justices Dennis and Lem-
mon in the denial of writs in De Laureal Eng'rs, Inc. v. St. Charles Parish Police Jury,
410 So. 2d 758 (La. 1982).
39. 42 U.S.C. SS 1981-1985 (1976 & Supp. 1980). Actions against municipal govern-
ments are permitted under S 1983. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
40. Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, 441 F. Supp. 1121 (E.D. La. 1977), aff'd, 622
F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980).
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FORCED HEIRSHIP AND TRUSTS
ARTICLE XII, SECTION 5
The limit on trusts and the prohibition against abolishing forced
heirship, provisions which first appeared in the 1921 constitution and
which are continued in article XII, section 5, reflect the influence of
the civil law preservationists. In an argument often more romantic
than realistic, maintenance of the state's unique ties to French culture
becomes merged with maintenance of the civil law and a number of
its basic institutions. Forced heirship, provided in the state's civil codes
from the earliest times, is part of this institutional backdrop and part
of the preservationist creed.41
In the 1921 constitutional convention process, a 1920 statute
authorizing trusts apparently provoked introduction of a provision to
ban them and, as a related concern, to continue forced heirship." The
compromise, which became article 4, section 16, did allow some trusts,
but it also prohibited abolition of forced heirship. Subsequent amend-
ments allowed more exceptions. In any event, the constitution adopted
the principle, but it had little effect. Virtually any trusts were allowed,
and the lesson of the jurisprudence was that the forced heirship pro-
visions of the Civil Code could be amended and the rights of forced
heirs lessened, as long as the institution was not "abolished. 43 To
the extent that the cases left room for the argument that a substan-
tial, although undefined, level of rights in forced heirs had to be
preserved, the text of the new provisions and the record of the 1974
constitutional proceedings undercut this argument.
The text simply states that no law may "abolish" forced heirship.
The normal meaning of the term abolish is complete destruction, and
as long as any kind of forced portion to any class of forced heirs exists,
forced heirship is not abolished. The second sentence of article XII,
section 5 confirms this view, specifying that the legislature may deter-
mine who are forced heirs and the amount of the forced portion. There
is not much else to determine. The legislature, under this provision,
could limit the forced rights to minor, needy children or could make
41. See, e.g., Lemann, In Defense of Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REV. 20 (1977);
Nathan, An Assault on the Citadel: A Rejection of Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REV.
5 (1977). Nathan asserts that the prohibition on abolition resulted from "fear that this
issue would be too hot a political potato for a constitution that was already highly
controversial." Nathan, supra, at 5 n.1.
42. Dainow, The Early Sources of Forced Heirship; Its History in Texas and Loui-
siana, 4 LA. L. REV. 42, 67 & nn.131-32 (1941). See especially the comments of the spon-
sor of the constitutional provision. Id. at 68 n.134.
43. Succession of Earhart, 220 La. 817, 57 So. 2d 695 (1952).
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the only forced heir the surviving spouse of the decedent. The con-
clusion is the same as that stated many years ago in a law review
comment: "That nothing along these lines is even remotely foreseeable,
barring certain proposed changes with respect to the parent's share
of community property in a childless marriage, is due more to an
almost emotional attachment of Louisiana law makers to the institu-
tion of forced heirship than to constitutional restrictions.""
Members of the Judiciary Committee and the Committee on Bill
of Rights and Elections had before them staff documents which sug-
gested that the 1921 provision was not effective and did "not prevent
the legislature from making changes in the categories of forced heirs
or in the portion of the deceased's estate which constitutes the
legitime."45 While the language cited to support this view may have
been dictum on the point, the language of Succession of Earhart46 was
accepted as the existing position of the jurisprudence: "The words,
'no law shall be passed abolishing forced heirship,' mean exactly what
they say, in other words, that forced heirship cannot be done away
with wholly, wiped out or destroyed. This provision does not prohibit
the legislature from regulating or restricting the rights of forced
heirs." 7
Delegate Stinson, representing the Committee on Bill of Rights
and Elections, which proposed article XII, section 5, explained to the
delegates: "Neither do they say that children will be forced heirs of
fathers and mothers and their ascending line. It will be left up to
the legislature."' Delegate Tobias stated, "As I presently read Loui-
siana constitution and statutes, the legislature could very simply say
that each child is a forced heir to the extent of one dollar."49 Delegate
Dennery agreed with Delegate Avant, in that "[tihere would be a
system of forced heirship, but what it consisted of, and all the
refinements thereof, would be up to the legislature."'
An examination of the convention transcript reveals an amazing
lack of discussion of the underlying policy issues related to the in-
stitution of forced heirship. The explanation for this lack of discus-
sion is probably that the section was ineffective and thus not related
44. Comment, Forced Heirs, the Legitime, and Loss of the Legitime in Louisiana,
37 TUL. L. REV. 710, 723 (1963).
45. Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections Staff Memo, July 31, 1973 at
X RECORDS: COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS 134, 135. See also Judiciary Committee Staff Memo
No. 21, June 6, 1973 at XI RECORDS: COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS 358.
46. 220 La. 817, 57 So. 2d 695 (1952).
47. 220 La. at 824-25, 57 So. 2d at 697.
48. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Jan. 3, 1974 at 3073.
49. Id. at 3075.
50. Id. at 3078.
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to the basic policy issues. In any event, the traditionalists were
satisfied with a hortatory commitment to forced heirship, and the
opponents were satisfied that the legislature was not truly limited
in what it could do in this regard.
A court which would be inclined to ignore this legislative history
(perhaps arguing that it does not necessarily reflect the intent of the
voters who adopted the document) and hold that some reasonable frac-
tion of legitime is required would be in a difficult position. There are
simply no traditional legal standards as to what share (percentage
or amount) of a deceased's patrimony is part of the forced portion,
and there are no legal standards as to who must be forced heirs. Lack
of certain judicial standards seems to be another reason supporting
the view that the legislature can severely erode the institution, as
long as it keeps some absolute minimum aspect of forced heirship.
PROPERTY RELATED PROVISIONS
ARTICLE IX, SECTIONS 3 AND 4
The strong Civil Code policy against private ownership of the beds
of navigable water bodies, which became a constitutional rule through
article 2, section 2 of the 1921 constitution,51 continues in article IX,
section 3 of the 1974 constitution:
The legislature shall neither alienate nor authorize the alienation
of the bed of a navigable water body, except for purposes of
reclamation by the riparian owner to recover land lost through
erosion. This Section shall not prevent the leasing of state lands
or water bottoms for mineral or other purposes. Except as pro-
vided in this Section, the bed of a navigable water body may be
reclaimed only for public use.
It is clear by this provision that the state itself cannot alienate the
bed of a navigable water body, and any attempt to do so is null.
Moreover, the state cannot "authorize the alienation" by any other
governmental agency or by a general statute. More broadly, section
3 is the basis for saying, consistent with traditional Civil Code prin-
ciples, that these beds are out of commerce and insusceptible of private
ownership. Not only are sales or other contractual alienations impossi-
ble, but such property is incapable of acquisition by prescription or
of seizure and sale by creditors of the state.
51. California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954), which allowed private
ownership of the beds of navigable water bodies that were included in old land grants,
has been overruled by Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1975).
52. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 41-48 in 2 LOUISIANA
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In view of the constitutional reference to "navigable" water bodies
and similar Civil Code provisions, a stream that becomes nonnavigable
is no longer under this rule, and the state may alienate its bed or
authorize its alienation.' The constitution does not provide for loss
of state ownership in such a case, but the prohibition against aliena-
tion is lifted. Conversely, if a nonnavigable stream becomes navigable,
it would cease to be susceptible of private ownership and would
become property of the state. The argument that such a change in
ownership may be a taking without due process (absent compensation)'
probably falls because such a loss is not caused by the state itself.
Rather, the loss is part of the natural changes in water bodies. In-
deed, if this is a taking without due process, the entrenched institu-
tion of loss of land by dereliction55 and by natural expansion of water
bodies to cover more area" should be equally unconstitutional. Case
law and recent legislation have treated man-made canals as private
things, even if navigable. 7 Article IX, section 3 was not designed to
affect those rules, and it probably would be a taking without due pro-
cess for the state to take ownership of beds of privately dug navigable
canals.
Although the convention did not adopt provisions similar to Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 9:1151," which provides that rights under
outstanding mineral leases are not affected by changes in ownership
resulting from changes in water bodies, the statute remains in effect
and is not prohibited by the constitution. Nothing is taken from the
riparian landowner who has gained land by accretion if he obtains
the land without the mineral rights; he had no vested interest in the
land to begin with. Article IX, section 3 does not prohibit the state,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 107-45 (2d ed. 1980). Seizure by creditors also is prohibited by LA.
CONST. art. XII, S 10(C; prescription is also covered by LA. CONST. art. XII, S 13.
53. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY S 41 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 107,
112 (2d ed. 1980).
54. Id., S 41 at 112-13.
55. LA. CiV. CODE art. 499.
56. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936).
57. LA. CrV. CODE art. 450, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 728, S 1, reflects this
understanding, making a reference to "natural" navigable water bodies. This reflects
prior jurisprudence, National Audubon Soc'y v. White, 302 So. 2d 660 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1964), and federal standards, Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp., 444 U.S. 206 (1979).
58. The relevant provisions from Committee Proposal No. 34 which were not
adopted read as follows:
Section 6. Mineral rights to land formed or exposed by accretion or dereliction
caused principally by acts of man, on a water body the bed of which is owned
by the state, are retained by the state.
Section 7. Mineral rights to land lost by erosion caused principally by acts of
man, on a navigable water body, are retained by the riparian landowner.
IV RECORDS: CONVENTION INSTRUMENTS 263.
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which obtains land by dereliction, from obtaining less than full owner-
ship, as no alienation or authorization of alientation has occurred. 9
Attempts to be more specific in the constitution with respect to ac-
cretion and dereliction caused "principally" by acts of man failed, part-
ly because of the ambiguity of such proposals and partly because of
the supreme court's reversal of position in State v. Placid Oil Co.6"
to a position more favorable to the state.
New to the constitution is the exception that permits the state
to transfer the bed of a navigable water body to a riparian landowner
reclaiming land lost through erosion. Although the committee propos-
ed that this exception be limited to land lost during the most recent
10-year period,6 the convention adopted an amendment removing that
restriction. 62 Of course, the constitution does not require that such
transfers be made; it simply allows such alienations. The legislature
has adopted a statute allowing reclamation of land lost "through ero-
sion by action of this navigable water body occurring on and after
July 1, 1921."1
While liberalizing reclamation by private riparian landowners, the
constitution limits the power of governmental units to reclaim and
otherwise fill in beds of navigable water bodies. The prior law allow-
ed the state to alienate such beds "for purposes of reclamation,"64
whereas the new document provides that "the bed of a navigable water
body may be reclaimed only for public use." The limitation was pro-
posed by the Committee on Natural Resources,65 the chairman mak-
ing it clear that past practices (particularly with respect to Lake Pont-
chartrain) of filling in the bed of a waterbody and then selling lots
to private owners for home construction would not be permitted.6
Indeed, an amendment supported by the delegates from the parishes
59. Although the rehearing opinion in the case made the discussion on the point
moot, the original opinion in State v. Placid Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 154 (La. 1974), sug-
gested that LA. R.S. 9:1151 was constitutional.
60. 300 So. 2d 154, 172 (La. 1974).
61. Committee Proposal No. 34, S 4 at IV RECORDS: CONVENTION INSTRUMENTS 263.
62. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 18, 1973 at 2938. The statement in
the Transcripts that the amendment was rejected is incorrect. See II RECORDS: JOUR.
NAL AND CALENDAR, Dec. 18, 1973 at 1031 for the indication that the amendment was
adopted.
63. LA. R.S. 41:1702 (Supp. 1978). Suggestions in 1975 LA. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 1602 (Jan.
8, 1976) that art. IX, S 3 of the constitution would not be applied to lands eroded
before the effective date of the 1974 constitution are not supported by the constitu-
tional convention record. There should be no doubt that LA. R.S. 41:1702 is constitu-
tional in reaching back to 1921 for a starting point; it could have reached much fur-
ther back had the legislature so decided.
64. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. 4, S 2.
65. Committee Proposal No. 34, S 4 at IV RECORDS: CONVENTION INSTRUMENTS 263.
66. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 18, 1973 at 2936.
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of Orleans and Jefferson to allow more development along the lake
was rejected by a sizable margin of 37-60.67 The convention was more
concerned with the interests of sportsmen and other users of water
bodies than with development. Indeed, the basic decision is that areas
subject to public use (as are all navigable water bodies) cannot be
removed from public use. When reclamation does occur, the reclaim-
ed land must be for some substitute public use.
As the debate on residential development demonstrates, the
reference is not to "public purposes," the concept often used in ex-
propriation matters" and which is broadly construed to include private
ownership under urban renewal plans.69 The reference is to a narrower
"public use" concept borrowed from the Civil Code, with its tradi-
tional narrow definition of the concept. °
It is of course true that an important interest of the state in
regards to its lands, including beds of water bodies, is the revenue
accruing from oil and gas production. This interest is reflected in ar-
ticle IX, section 3, which declares that the lease of state lands and
water bottoms for mineral and other purposes is permissible. Although
mineral servitudes of private owners expire upon ten years nonuse, 71
article IX, section 4 makes it clear that the same is not true with
respect to "lands and mineral interests" held by the state, a school
board, or a levee district. The reference to mineral interests is to
those rights that normally can be lost by liberative prescription of
nonuse. Section 4 goes further, however, and refers to land, which
never could be lost by liberative prescription."2 The reference makes
sense only if it is construed to mean that lands of these enumerated
bodies cannot be acquired by other persons by acquisitive prescrip-
tion. The provision makes no distinction between land that would be
classified as a public thing as opposed to a private thing; under the
Civil Code, the latter would be subject to prescription." The reference
is not to all governmental land; the initial proposal referred to state
67. Id. at 2942.
68. LA. CONST. art. I, S 4 uses the traditional language in limiting expropriation to
"public purposes."
69. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
70. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE arts. 452, 455, 456. Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Orleans
Levee Bd., 368 So. 2d 1210 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), is probably correct in holding
that construction of an airport available for use by the general public (although at
a fee) is within the permissible public uses under LA. CONST. art. IX, S 3. Cf LA. R.S.
9:1102.1 (Supp. 1975 & 1981). To the extent that such statutes would allow "leases"
for long periods tantamount to alienation, they are suspect in light of the constitu-
tional limitation.
71. LA. R.S. 31:27 (Supp. 1974).
72. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 481.




lands and minerals,74 and floor amendments were adopted to include
school boards and levee districts."5 Municipalities and police juries and
other governmental units are not included, although their lands
classified as public things under the Civil Code are not subject to
prescription. Their lands considered private things are prescriptable.8
Land Use, Zoning, and Historic Preservation-Article VI, Section 17
In light of the general powers of municipalities,77 it probably was
not necessary to specify that they have the power to regulate land
use, zoning, and historic preservation." Article VI, section 17, however,
began primarily as a means of ensuring the existing status of the
Vieux Carre Commission, which had been established by a 1936 amend-
ment to the 1921 constitution."9 As the convention proceeded, the pro-
vision was made more general, and section 17 now allows all local
governments to establish commissions and districts to control "use,
construction, demolition, and modification of areas and structures.""0
Since "land use, zoning, and historic preservation" are public purposes,
property can be expropriated for these purposes, but the
reasonableness of any particular regulation is still subject to article
I, section 4 and the rights there established to use one's property
as one wants, subject only to "reasonable" restrictions.8'
Tax Sales-Article VII, Section 25
Although the formal committee proposals were silent as to the
means for enforcing payment of ad valorem taxes, Delegate Avant
sponsored a floor amendment to continue provisions of the 1921 con-
stitution designed to prevent forfeiture of property for nonpayment
of taxes and to provide for redemption rights. 2 After a series of at-
tempts, he was successful in procuring the adoption of what became
article VII, section 25. An attempt to pass a condensation of the prior
74. Committee Proposal No. 34, S 5 at IV RECORDS: CONVENTION INSTRUMENTS 263.
75. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 18, 1973 at 2943-44.
76. A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY S 34 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 95 (2d
ed. 1980). See also LA. CONST. art XII, § 13; VII RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Oct.
3, 1973 at 1566-69; LA. R.S. 9:5804 (1950) (the special statute regarding prescription of
land owned by municipalities).
77. See LA. CONST. art. VI, SS 7, 15.
78. LA. CONST. art. VI, S 17.
79. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. 14, S 22A (proposed by 1936 La. Acts, No. 139; adopted
Nov. 3, 1936).
80. Comments to Committee Proposal No. 8, S 19 at I RECORDS: JOURNAL OF PRO-
CEEDINGS, July 6, 1973 at 107-08.
81. See Hargrave, Declaration, supra note 34, at 12.
82. VIII RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Nov. 6, 1973 at 2140-47; IX RECORDS:
CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Jan. 12, 1974 at 3313.
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article was met with objections about its uncertainty, so Delegate
Avant returned with what he described as "word for word the provi-
sions of Article X, Section 11 of the Constitution of 1921."'1 After
final styling, section 25(0) has slightly different punctuation from its
predecessor, making it uncertain and less than clear. Citing the con-
stitutional convention purpose of continuing the prior jurisprudence,
the court in Kemper v. Dearing" applied the new language in light
of the predecessor provision so as to make no change in the law, and
the procedure for annulling tax titles remains what it was before the
1974 constitution.8 5
LIMITS ON LOCAL AND SPECIAL LAWS
ARTICLE III, SECTION 12
Local and Special Laws
An important innovation in article III, section 12 of the 1974 con-
stitution is the prohibition against local or special laws "[d]efining any
crime." Not proposed by the Committee on Legislative Powers and
Functions,' this provision originated in a floor amendment proposed
by Delegate Avant, a delegate appointed to represent wildlife and
conservation interests. 7 Asserting those interests, he sought to end
the existence of state laws which defined the crime of trespass dif-
ferently in specified parishes, although he recognized that his pro-
posal would apply to all state crimes." State v. LaBauve8' and State
v. Slay'M have been true to the prohibition, invalidating laws regulating
83. VIII RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Nov. 6, 1973 at 2141.
84. 369 So. 2d 1208 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
85. See Harrell, Title Problems in Tax Sales, 1980 INST. ON MIN. LAw 246.
86. See Committee Proposal No. 3, S 12 at IV RECORDS: CONVENTION INSTRUMENTS
8; also at I RECORDS: JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS [originally published as OFFICIAL JOUR.
NAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 OF THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA], July 6, 1973 at 90; an earlier draft appears at X RECORDS: COMMITTEE
DOCUMENTS 216.
87. In addition to 105 elected delegates, the convention was composed of twenty-
seven delegates appointed by the governor. Twelve of those were required to repre-
sent certain interest groups, and fifteen were at-large appointments. See 1972 La. Acts,
No. 2, providing for the holding of the constitutional convention. Delegate John L.
Avant, an attorney often identified with labor interests, was appointed to represent
"wildlife and conservation."
88. V RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Aug. 1, 1973 at 487-90; IX RECORDS: CON-
VENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Jan. 8, 1974 at 3188-91. For the patchwork criminal trespass
statutes that existed at that time, see LA. R.S. 14:63 and 14:63.5 to 14:63.11 (repealed
by 1981 La. Acts, No. 78, SS 1 & 3).
89. 359 So. 2d 181 (La. 1978).
90. 370 So. 2d 508 (La. 1979).
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the size of fish nets that were not uniformly applicable throughout
the state. In LaBauve, the laws were not even uniformly applicable
in two named parishes in which they partially applied.' In other
respects, section 12 is basically a continuation of the predecessor pro-
vision of the 1921 constitution'- it contains a lengthy catalogue of
subjects on which there can be no local or special laws. Nonuniform
legislation touching on other subjects is allowed, however, and sec-
tion 13 provides a notice and advertisement procedure for bills pro-
posing permitted local or special laws. Section 13 requires a public
notice in the affected area at least thirty days before the. introduc-
tion of the bill. Since there will be no statewide application of the
statute, thus less likelihood of statewide scrutiny during the legislative
process, there must be the opportunity for local scrutiny in the area
affected or by the subclass of citizens affected. This again is little
change from the prior constitution. The convention earnestly sought
a cleaner and shorter way of handling the problem of laws that do
not apply uniformly. Communications between committees,93 changes
in drafts,94 and postponement of the issue until the closing days of
the convention95 all were directed toward finding a workable formula.
.The Committee on Legislative Powers and Functions did propose the
simple language of the Model State Constitution: "The legislature shall
pass no local or special law when a general law is or can be made
applicable."9 However, the vagueness and uncertainty of that provi-
sion troubled many delegates.97 This concern, along with the inertia
91. The regulation applied only to those parts of Lafourche Parish and Terrebonne
Parish south of the Intracoastal Waterway. 359 So. 2d at 184 app. A.
92. See LA. CONST. of 1921, art. 4, SS 4 & 6.
93. In response to a request by the Committee on Legislative Powers and Func-
tions, the Judiciary Committee suggested the Model State Constitution approach plus
an illustrative listing, whereas a subcommittee of the Committee on Revenue, Finance
and Taxation suggested an enumeration similar to article 4, section 4 of the 1921
constitution. See X RECORDS: COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS 265.
94. Compare the final Committee Proposal No. 3, S 12 at IV RECORDS: CONVEN-
TION INSTRUMENTS 8 with the earlier second committee draft at X RECORDS: COMMITTEE
DOCUMENTS 216.
95. V RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Aug. 1, 1973 at 491.
96. Committee Proposal No. 3, S 12 at IV RECORDS: CONVENTION INSTRUMENTS 8;
also at I RECORDS: JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS, July 6, 1973 at 90.
97. Delegate Conroy explained the reasons for the retention of listing thusly:
I think there has been a genuine concerted effort on the part of those on the
committee, on the part of a number of delegates to come up with appropriate
general language to cope with this problem. We have been unable to do so. Despite
every effort and the amendment that you will see each of them opens new pro-
blems, causes new concerns; and we, those of us who have worked on this, really
feel that the wisdom of the constitution in this case that we have is correct, is
regrettable that it is so long, but we think that it shows what has happened
historically in the state.
V RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Aug. 1, 1973 at 486.
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of the convention process, finally led to the adoption of the approach
that the Louisiana State Law Institute had taken in its projet of a
constitution. "The Institute considered that the limitations in the pre-
sent [1921] constitution represented attempts to correct abuses that
had actually occured in Louisiana and, therefore, considered it wise
to retain them."98 That long list of limitations came primarily from
the 1879 constitution, which had set a new high for statutory detail
and which added 15 new sections of forbidden local and special laws.
Most were reactions to legislation adopted during the Republican
Reconstruction Government following the Civil War.9
Related to article III, section 12 are several provisions in the local
government article requiring general laws in a number of instances
and prohibiting "local or special" laws in other instances. In this
regard, article VI, section 3 specifically allows the legislature to
"classify parishes or municipalities according to population or any other
reasonable basis related to the purpose of the classification. Legisla-
tion may be limited in its effect to any of such class or classes." Arti-
cle VI, section 44 also defines "general law," when used in that arti-
cle, as "a law of statewide concern enacted by the legislature which
is uniformly applicable to all persons or to all political subdivisions
in the state or which is uniformly applicable to all persons or to all
.98. 2 LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROJET OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE
OF LOUISIANA 392 (1954); V RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Aug. 1, 1973 at 485.
I think that . . . as I said before, the desire of everybody was to try to make
this a briefer constitution. But, I don't think anybody was able to come up with
the language that would accomplish what we wanted to do and at the same time
carry forward the types of prohibitions that the state has had and which I think
have operated successfully in the state.
IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Jan. 8, 1974 at 3186.
99. A. POWELL, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONS in 1 LOUISIANA STATE LAW
INSTITUTE, supra note 98, at 400. The 1954 Law Institute Projet listed the following Loui-
siana acts as indicative of the type of legislation that was to be prohibited.
(a) Act 13 of 1876 declared legitimate the six children of Joseph Duvigneaud
and his wife, Marie Julia Freed.
(b) Act 22 of 1876 reduced the tax assessments on the property of the succes-
sion of E.C. Hart, deceased, for the years 1873 and 1874 and remitted all penalties
and forfeitures for the said years.
(c) Act 30 of 1876 changed the name of Caroline Vallee to Caroline Nott.
(d) Act 3 of 1871 changed the venue in the case of David Fisher, J.C. Oliver,
and Celestine Oliver, charged with murder, from Ascension Parish to Jefferson
Parish.
(e) Act 40 of 1871 incorporated the Alexandria, Homer, and Fulton Railroad Co.
and granted State aid thereto.
(f) Act 52 of 1871 granted to J. J. Warren and J. W. Crawford the exclusive
right of keeping a ferry across the Atchafalaya River for ten years.
(g) Act 46 of 1875 appropriated $5000 for the relief of the widow and children
of Judge John J. Morgan.
1 LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 98, at 402.
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political subdivisions within the same class." These provisions in arti-
cle VI tend to reflect the existing case law and the existing under-
standing of local or special laws.1
Section 12 (B) of article III, which prohibits the indirect enact-
ment of local or special laws "by the partial repeal or suspension of
a general law," was added by floor amendment to "close the back
door""1 1 and cement the protection against this kind of legislation. The
addition continues a provision of the 1921 constitution and was prob-
ably not necessary, but its adoption does serve to indicate the depth
and intensity of the concerns the convention had in this area.
The crucial issue, of course, is whether a statute is a local law
or a special law, just as it was before the adoption of the new con-
stitution. Courts have been less than clear in distinguishing between
laws that are local and those that are special. Often, the term "local
and special" is used as though it were one concept. However, the con-
stitution does make a distinction between the two. The distinction
probably is that "local" laws do not apply uniformly across the state,
with the exceptions based on geography or location, and "special" laws
do not apply uniformly, with the exceptions based on something other
than geography or location.0 2 In a sense, local laws are a type of special
law, the nonuniform standard being geography rather than age, sex,
hair color, or some other standard. In any event, under the
jurisprudence these issues involve classification in statutes and raise
the same questions that are raised by the equal protection clause.
In both instances, the question is the rational basis for the
classification.
Local Laws-Territorial Uniformity
The convention debates suggest that a high level of justification
ought to be required for statutes that do not apply uniformly
throughout the territory of the state. Particularly suspect is a statute
whose application depends on parish or other political boundaries. The
1921 constitution contained many "Orleans excepted" provisions; the
100. Since LA. CONST. art. III, S 12 begins with the usual "[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided in this constitution" formula, it is clear that more specific provisions in other
sections of the document will prevail over section 12. It is also clear, by the references
in section 12(A)(7) to "private" corporations, that this limitation does not affect govern-
mental corporations.
101. The quotation is that of Delegate Drew, who proposed the amendment. IX
RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Jan. 8, 1974 at 3187; V RECORDS: CONVENTION
TRANSCRIPTS, Aug. 1, 1973 at 487, See LA. CONST. of 1921, art. 4, S 5.
102. See generally Comment, General and Special Laws in Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REV.
768 (1956).
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1973 convention made a fetish out of eliminating these references.'0 3
Twice the convention expressed its disapproval of state criminal
trespass statutes that varied from parish to parish." The court deci-
sions are in accord. A reapportionment statute that applied only to
the Caddo Parish School Board was held unconstitutional,' as were
a statute that applied only to areas in Lafourche and Terrebone
Parishes south of the Intracoastal Waterway,' a statute that pro-
hibited banlis in nine parishes from opening on Saturdays while allow-
ing banks in other parishes to remain open," 7 and a statute that re-
quired certain kinds of fish nets in some areas of the state and other
nets in other areas.100 Whether there is involved one named parish,
a designated area of a parish, or several designated parishes, the
statute ought to be considered a local law if the statute does not app-
ly statewide. The inquiry then becomes whether the classification is
reasonable. Article VI, section 3 suggests that with a reasonable basis
for the classification, the distinction will be allowed. As in equal pro-
tection. analysis, the question becomes largely a factual one aimed at
the distinctions between the areas involved. With respect to fish nets,
for example, if there had been sufficient biological or other factual
reasons for using different nets in different waters with different kinds
of fish, they probably would have supported different laws for those
areas.' Of course, such classifications normally would have to be based
on characteristics of the water bodies rather than parish boundaries.
Indeed, the author of the amendment which added "defining any
crime" to the list of prohibited local and special laws noted that if
there were biological bases for different hunting and fishing regula-
tions, they would serve as a sufficient basis for different game regula-
tions in different areas."0 It has been suggested, for example, that
rules relating to trapping in marsh areas might be adopted which are
different than trapping rules for nonmarsh areas, although a statute
that excluded some marsh areas and included others was not
sustained.'
103. This is evident in the debates concerning the reduction of the terms of Orleans
district judges to make them uniform with the judges in all other judicial districts.
See Hargrave, Judiciary, supra note 34, at 819.
104. See notes 88-91, supra.
105. Caddo Parish School Bd. v. Board of Elections Supervisors, 384 So. 2d 448
(La. 1980).
106. State v. LaBauve, 359 So. 2d 181 (La. 1978).
107. State Through State Banking Dep't v. Acadiana Bank & Trust Co., 360 So.
2d 846 (La. 1978).
108. State v. Slay, 370 So. 2d 508 (La. 1979).
109. Id. at 511.
110. V RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Aug. 1, 1973 at 490; IX RECORDS: CONVEN-
TION TRANSCRIPTS, Jan. 8, 1974 at 3188.
111. State v. Clement, 188 La. 923, 178 So. 493 (1938).
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Classifications based on population are often upheld, with the dif-
ferences in urban and rural conditions often considered the reasonable
basis for the distinction in regulations. Article VI, section 3 suggests
that population may be a valid basis of classification, as long as it
is reasonable. The important element is that the category is not
closed-the statute can apply to other areas that reach the stated
population in the future. It is doubtful, then, that classifications bas-
ed on the population as of the 1980 census are valid. Such classifica-
tions include only some areas as of an established time, without the
prospect of other areas being covered when they meet the same con-
ditions that support different treatment. Also questionable are the
typical "Orleans excepted" provisions in statutes. As stated earlier,
these exceptions are virtually gone from the constitution. If the
"Orleans excepted" word formula was a substitute for a population
classification, as may well have been true,112 then it is required that
the courts construe such exceptions to allow application to other cities
and parishes when they reach the size of Orleans. However, some
uncertainty might exist as to whether the population at the time of
the adoption of the statute or the population at the present time is
the basis for the classification. In any event, absent some kind of
judicial legerdemain, the "Orleans excepted" provisions should be found
to be invalid unless some rational basis to support the distinction in
a particular statute can be found.
Special Laws-Equal Protection
The adoption of an equal protection clause in the 1974 constitu-
tion makes the prohibition against special legislation less important
than it formerly was. Certainly, any classification based on race,
religion, or political beliefs falls because the prohibition against such
classifications is absolute."' Other classifications are tested on a less
rigorous basis, depending on the character of the classification involved
and the strength of the state interest supporting the distinction. Since
local and special analysis is similar to equal protection analysis in judg-
ing the reasonableness of classifications and discriminations, it would
be simple to make the standards the same for both, resulting in
greater simplicity and clarity in applying the constitution. Testing
classifications by two different standards of reasonableness is not an
ideal system. Simplifying this inquiry, though, presents problems.
The local and special provisions came from the Committee on
Legislative Powers and Functions, and the equal protection guarantee
112. See Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975
Term-Legislative Process, 36 LA. L. REV. 549, 549-52 (1976).
113. See LA. CONST. art I, S 3; Hargrave, Declaration, supra note 34, at 6.
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came from the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections. The two
committees did not relate the provisions to each other. The local and
special provision is one of long standing in the constitution, with its
own history and method of construction. The equal protection clause
was an innovation in the 1974 constitution, drafted with federal con-
stitutional equal protection precedents in mind.
The differences go beyond history; the text is difficult to bend
to make the two concepts congruent. If a classification is determined
to deny equal protection, that is the end of the analysis and the statute
falls. However, if a statute is local or special, it automatically falls
only if it touches certain subjects; otherwise, it can be valid if prop-
erly advertised. Application of the same reasonableness standards
across the board thus would result in making all local or special laws
fall, a result not consistent with section 13.
If one tries to minimize the difference in results by treating sec-
tion 12 as concerned with local laws (geographic classifications) and
construing the "special" category (all other classifications) as a nar-
row one better handled by equal protection analysis, one finds some
support in section 13. Section 13 requires advertisement in the locali-
ty affected by a nonuniform law. If the law has statewide application
to some classes (i.e., nongeographic classifications), it is hard to see
how section 13 can apply logically. Since the whole state is affected,
is it necessary to advertise statewide in the official journal of the
state?
The above approach also poses some problems, for the section 12
listing of forbidden subjects of local or special laws includes a number
of subjects that do involve nongeographic classifications. Perhaps the
solution to this lapse of consistency in drafting is to define as "special"
only those types of laws enumerated in section 12. Beyond that, the
scope of section 12 would be to apply to "local" laws which do not
have geographic uniformity. If these are not prohibited by the equal
protection guarantee or by section 12, the advertisement requirement
makes sense. Other classifications would be tested under equal pro-
tection. If there is no rational basis for their classifiction, they fall.
If there is such a basis, then the statute would be valid unless the
subject matter was one listed in section 12. Thus, the suggested recon-
ciliation would be to pursue the following analysis.
Determine whether the statute violates the equal protection clause
of article I, section 3. If it does, the statute falls. If it does not violate
equal protection standards (i.e., there is a reasonable basis for the
classification), the local and special analysis must be pursued.
If the statute is a geographic classification, it must be considered
a prohibited local law unless there exists a very high level of justifica-
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tion to support the distinction. (This is the same as applying article I,
section 3's highest level of scrutiny; however, the trigger is article III,
section 12, rather than the listing in article I, section 3. In this
way, the two sections are complementary and not inconsistent.) If it
is within the forbidden subjects listed in section 12, the statute falls.
If it is not, then advertisement is necessary.
If the statute is a nongeographic classification and concerns one
of the subjects listed in section 12, the statute should fall. (Here again,
section 12's listing is complementary to article I, section 3-section
12 being the trigger to invoke high scrutiny. The result is the same
as if article I, section 3 included these subjects as demanding higher
scrutiny.) If the statute is not within the listing, the statute should
not be considered special and should stand. No special laws would
require advertising, which is consistent with section 13's indication
that only geographic classifications invoke the advertising requirement.
This suggested approach differs somewhat from prior
jurisprudence, but prior jurisprudence has not been particularly
consistent."4 The approach is supported by the fact that the new con-
stitution adopted an equal protection clause, which now must be read
in relation to the similar policies of the local or special law provi-
sions. The analysis also helps to solve the problem of applying sec-
tion 13 to nongeographic classifications. It is also consistent with the
attitude displayed in many courts that treat the "local and special"
test as one requirement rather than two, for the analysis would limit
the special test to the items enumerated in section 12 and focus on
the local or geographic discrimination aspect.
Advertisement Procedure
Local or special laws on the subjects listed in section 12 are totally
prohibited. Other local or special laws are allowed if the procedure
of section 13-the essence of which is advertisement thirty days before
introduction of the bill-is adhered to. The advertisement must be
in the official journal "of the locality where the matter to be affected
is situated."
As section 13 is constructed, it specifies that no local or special
law "shall be enacted" unless the intent to introduce such a law has
been published. If a bill proposing a general law is introduced and
then amended to make it local or special, it would seem that this is
an enactment of a local or special law that is covered by section 13.
If the notice of intent to introduce is not present, the law must fall.
In short, one cannot adopt a local or special law by amendment of
114. See Comment, supra note 102.
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a bill proposing a general law. An amendment to the committee pro-
posal to adopt what became the final form of section 12 had the ex-
press purpose of preventing this amendment process. Delegate Lanier
stated:
The problem here would be if you were to introduce a general
law, then of course you would not be in violation of this prohibi-
tion that requires advertisement of local and special laws. But then,
if on the floor it was amended into a local or special law, you
could avoid the requirement of the advertisement procedure. So,
to avoid this loophole, I think we should ... put in "enacted by".
115
This conclusion is supported by the adoption, by floor amendment,
of article III, section 12(B), which prohibits "indirectly" enacting local
or special laws.
RETIREMENT BENEFITS
ARTICLE X, SECTION 29
New to the constitution isan attempt to provide some assurance
that governments will pay the benefits due under public retirement
systems. Such a provision opens new ground, but the value and en-
forceability of the guarantee obtained is debatable.
Committee proposals on the subject took three approaches: (1) a
"guarantee" by the state or the relevant political subdivision of
benefits payable, (2) a declaration that membership in a public retire-
ment system "shall be a contractual relationship between employee
and employer," and (3) a statement that "accrued benefits" "shall not
be diminished nor impaired.. 16 The convention debate generally con-
sisted of labor and education forces urging some kind of constitutional
protection for workers, although they were not certain of the con-
tours of that protection, while the accountants and other experts tried
to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity. The result was the adoption of
proposals (1) and (2) and the defeat of proposal (3).'7
Guarantee
Under article X, section 29(A), the state "guarantees" benefits
payable to members of the teachers retirement system, and under
29(B), it "guarantees" benefits to members of a state retirement
115. V RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, July 26, 1973 at 397.
116. Committee Proposal No. 11, S 1 at IV RECORDS: CONVENTION INSTRUMENTS 149.
117. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 5, 1973 at 2560-93; Id., Jan. 11, 1974
at 3284-86.
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system.118 The state does not "guarantee" benefits payable to members
of retirement systems established by political subdivisions.11 The scope
of the guarantee is not specified, but its importance rests on the fact
that the state's responsibility goes beyond making contributions to
a fund which is invested and which is used to pay retirement benefits.
Under this guarantee, the obligation to pay the benefits becomes one
backed by the "full faith and credit" of the state. If the money in
a retirement system fund is inadequate to pay the benefits, it is the
obligation of the state to furnish the funds to make up the difference.1"
This protection is no small achievement, particularly in contrast
to most private retirement systems. Nevertheless, the guarantee is
not self-enforcing and there is no mechanism to make the legislature
appropriate the funds needed to fulfill the guarantee.12 1 For example,
the constitution does not provide to employees as strong a guarantee
as it provides to bondholders. Article VII, section 9(B) automatically
appropriates money to the Bond Security and Redemption Fund suf-
ficient to pay the full faith and credit bonds of the state, "including
principal, interest, premiums, sinking or reserve fund, and other re-
quirements." Only after these are paid are funds transferred to the
state's general fund. There is also no constitutional means to require
the state to tax its citizens in amounts sufficient to pay the retire-
ment benefits guaranteed, '22 and in times of serious depression, the
''guarantee" is by no means an absolute assurance of payment of
benefits due.
A Contractual Relationship
Designating membership in a public retirement system "a contrac-
tual relationship" is an attempt to invoke the constitutional protec-
118. Teachers and related education employees are not employees of the state.
They are employed by local school boards and state universities, but the state pro-
vides the teacher retirement system. A separate retirement system is in effect for
other state employees, with different benefits and different regulations. See LA. R.S.
17:571-1342 (1950) (schoolteachers); LA. R.S. 42:541-691 (1950) (other state employees).
119. Although an amendment was adopted at one point to make the state the guaran-
tor of benefits due under retirement systems established by political subdivisions, this
was deleted at the close of the convention. In both instances, there was little discus-
sion of the issue. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 5, 1973 at 2585; Id., Jan.
11, 1974 at 3284-85.
120. Several references to the "full faith and credit" of the state were made dur-
ing the debate in explaining the effect of the provision. See IX RECORDS: CONVENTION
TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 5, 1973 at 2561, 2564.
121. See text at notes 28-40, supra (Enforcement of Judgments).
122. United States v. City of Macon, 99 U.S. 582, 591 (1878); Meyer v. City of Eufaula,
Okla., 132 F.2d 648, 652 (10th Cir. 1942).
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tion against impairment of the obligation of contracts. 23 The "contract"
would be between employer and employee -employers including the
state, state universities, local school boards, and subdivisions of the
state. Making the relationship a "contract" precludes analogy to the
federal social security program, which has been held not to establish
a contractual or vested right, but one subject to change in benefits
so long as minimal due process is afforded."' Presumably, the state
is circumscribed to a greater extent because it is constrained not only
by due process but by also the requirement that there can be no im-
pairment of the obligation of contracts. 2 '
An initial inquiry relates to the strength of the contracts clause
protection. The standard view is that expectations under contracts
are not absolutely protected, but, rather, the state can "restrict a party
to those gains reasonably to be expected from the contract.""' The
depression era debtor relief laws allowed reasonable statutes extend-
ing time periods for payment of debts. Under a similar analysis, the
same relief probably could be provided the state in times of severe
depression."'
Although the reasonable expectations accrued under a contract
are protected, prospective changes in the retirement systems are per-
mitted. Delegate Flory stated in debate, with respect to legislative
changes:
But, under the committee's proposal, what it mandates is that the
benefits earned up to the time that the legislature makes a change,
which it has every right to do, you can't change those benefits
earned up to that point. But you could abolish the system after
that, under this language. But what you are doing by your amend-
ment, is taking away the vested right that employee has once he
puts his money in that system. That's immoral. 18
123. LA. CONST. art. I, S 23; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, S 10.
124. "To engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of 'accrued property
rights' would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing
conditions which it demands." Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960). See also
Wollenberg, Vested Rights in Social Security Benefits, 37 OR. L. REv. 299, 359 (1958).
125. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 5, 1973 at 2562-63 (especially the
remarks of Delegate Jenkins).
126. El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515 (1965). However, the contracts clause
does impose some limits upon the power of a state to abridge existing contractual
relationships. "Legislation adjusting the rights and responsibilities of contracting par-
ties must be upon reasonable conditions and of a character appropriate to the public
purpose justifying its adoption." Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,
244 (1978) (quoting United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)).
127. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Morris, 181 La. 277, 159 So. 388 (1935); Wrenn
v. Miller, 161 So. 882 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
128. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 5, 1973 at 2567.
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Even after providing for several years, for example, that an employee
accrues a two percent annuity for each year of covered employment,
the legislature is not prohibited from amending the statute to pro-
vide a one percent per year accrual for the future. What is due under
the existing contract-what is vested, in other words-is the accrued
two percent formula for the prior years. Similarly, there should be
no problem with changing the rate of the contribution that an
employee makes to the retirement fund for the future. There is no
vested right to keep contributing at the same rate for the future if
the contract does not so provide. More difficult would be statutes
changing the base from which the annuity is figured- changing from
the "three highest years" formula common today to an "overall
average" formula that normally would result in a smaller benefit.
Changing the number of years service required before one is eligible
to retire also would pose a problem.
It is arguable that one's vested interest when a statute is changed
to a less favorable base is the base at the time of the change, as
though the employee were to leave employment. Under the existing
laws, for example, if one leaves state employment, one's percentage
is fixed on that date and one's base is fixed at the three highest years
at that time.'29 Arguably, one whose employment is continued should
be no better off as a result. For the remaining period of work, the
base would be figured under the new regulations, rather than the
three highest years, which would likely come at the end of one's tenure
and when one is under the new law. On the other hand, an analogy
could be made to the division of pension benefits accorded spouses
living under a community regime. The divorced or separated spouse
gets a proprotionate benefit based on the number of years of con-
tribution or work, taking advantage of the higher base which was
earned when the covered spouse was not married to the other per-
son. Thus the divorced spouse gets the benefit of facts that occurred
when there was no community. 3 ' To use the same approach here and
give the benefit of the three highest years perhaps would be grant-
ing more than the reasonable expectations. Indeed, in this uncertain
area, perhaps the best approach is to focus on defining reasonable
expectations. In this regard, the uncertainity as to factors such as
continued employment, the rate of inflation or deflation, and the
possibility of devaluation of currencies would all suggest that there
can be no reasonable reliance on concerns such as base salaries in
the future.
129. LA. R.S. 42:710 (Supp. 1978).
130. Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978); T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery,
332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
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There may be greater reliance and expectations placed on those
parts of the system that determine the number of years service re-
quired before one is entitled to an annuity. If the minimum were
changed from 20 to 25 years, for example, that would seem to be a
greater invasion of the individual interest than changing the computa-
tion of the base. Also, since it is readily determined, it is more cer-
tain and more likely to be relied on and thus more "vested." In any
event, the basic approach is to balance the intensity of the individual
interest against the intensity of the governmental interest, in the style
of the current flexible contracts clause analysis.
Diminishing or Impairing
The provision that "accrued benefits" "shall not be diminished nor
impaired" was not clear to the accountants and experts. It arguably
could have extended to preventing payment of current monies due
to retirees if doing so reduced the retirement system fund such that
there was less certainty of future retirees collecting their benefits
when they retired.131 If, during one year, more was paid out of the
fund than was paid in, future retirees' benefits arguably would be
"impaired." Because of this uncertainty, the convention adopted an
amendment by Delegate Lowe, a CPA who was also treasurer of the
convention, to delete that language."l2 The result of this action is to
give the state and its retirement system managers flexibility in the
management of retirement funds without fear that some investment
policy or some short term losses might be an improper "diminishing"
or "impairing" of members' ultimate benefits.
GAMBLING AND LOTTERIES
ARTICLE XII, SECTION 6
To the purist, provisions that are not self-executing or limitations
on the legislature do not belong in a constitution. In the real world
of constitutional conventions, however, such provisions become part
of the document; the myth and the hope may be more important than
the operative legal language. Tradition, compromise, last minute
rushes, inertia, and fear of alienating some voters' sacred cows all
came into play and resulted in a number of such "nonconstitutional"
provisions in the 1974 constitution. Perhaps little ought to be said
about them, since they have little legal effect. However, it is impor-
tant to realize that these provisions are basically sermons and are
131. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 5, 19173 at 2565-66, 2570-74, 2578.
132. Id. at 2574, 2584.
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not to be applied otherwise. The section on gambling and lotteries
is the best example of the fact that the drafters of the constitution
knew what they were doing when they provided unenforceable hor-
tatory provisions.
The constitution prohibits government lotteries, but other aspects
of gambling are uncontrolled. Article XII, section 6 provides that
"[glambling shall be defined by and suppressed by the legislature,"
but this is a nonself-executing provision which leaves the legislature
free to work its will with respect to the definition and mode of sup-
pression. The development of this provision is a prime example of
the state's accommodation to its pluralistic population, which balances
north and south, Catholic and Protestant, Francophone and Anglofile,
and black and white in a kind of detente that results in Byzantine
politics that justify characterizing the state as the northernmost of
the banana republics '33 and the most western of the Arab states.'34
References to gambling or lotteries can be found in most of Loui-
siana's constitutions. The 1879 document allowed the chartering of
the Louisiana lottery, which resulted in an infamously corrupt period
of the state's history,' 3 while the other constitutions have prohibited
gambling in various forms.'36 In the 1921 document, the exhortation
was more moral than legal. Article 19, section 8, in addition to a pro-
hibition against all lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets, stated,
"Gambling is a vice and the Legislature shall pass laws to suppress
it." This high-sounding injunction was recognized as nonself-executing
in Gandolfo v. Louisiana State Racing Commission,'37 in which the
supreme court allowed the legislature to provide for pari-mutuel bet-
ting at race tracks. The result was a high-sounding constitutional
133. See V.O. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS 156 (1950), where Huey Long's control of Loui-
siana is compared to that of a South American dictator.
134. " A.J. LIEBLING, THE EARL OF LOUISIANA 18 (1961). See also a quotation attributed
to New Orleans mayor Martin Behrman, "You can make prostitution illegal in Loui-
siana, but you can't make it unpopular." T.H. WILLIAMS, HUEY LONG 131 (1969). Perhaps
the final result is apt recognition of what the King told Alice: "If there is no meaning
in it, that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't try to find any." L.
CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 115
(Schocken ed. 1978).
135. C. DUFOUR, TEN FLAGS IN THE WIND: THE STORY OF LOUISIANA 215-16 (1967).
136. Lotteries were constitutionally allowed from 1864-1898: LA. CONST. of 1864, art.
116; LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 167. No mention of the lottery is made in the 1868 constitu-
tion. Other constitutions have prohibited gambling: LA. CONST. of 1845, art. 116; LA.
CONST. of 1852, art. 113; LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 178; LA. CONST. of 1913, art. 178; LA.
CONST. of 1921, art. 19, S 8.
137. 227 La. 45, 78 So. 2d 504 (1954). Although not technically relevant to the con-
stitutional question, the Civil Code's provisions against the enforcement of gambling
debts do make exception "for games tending to promote skill in the use of arms, such
as the exercise of the gun and foot, horse and chariot racing." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2983.
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guarantee that placated some fundamentalist interests, while allow-
ing those who wanted to gamble to do so.
The committees of the constitutional convention, facing a provi-
sion which had no important effect and desiring to shorten the docu-
ment, took no action to continue the prohibition. No committee pro-
posals on gambling were introduced, resulting in a situation in which
lotteries would not be prohibited. Attention focused upon this nar-
row topic as the constitutional convention approached its closing
deadline amid marathon workdays and late night sessions. A proposal
by Delegate Planchard sought to simply add that "[n]either the state
nor any of its political subdivisions shall conduct a lottery."'' 8 While
acknowledging that his provision would allow private lotteries3 ' and
admitting that the term "lottery" was unclear,'"' the delegate re-
ferred to the expansion of state lotteries in the eastern United States
and stated that his aim was to stop that from occurring in Louisiana.
Delegate Burns then introduced an amendment to return to the
language of the 1921 constitution, and the debate burst open. Delegate
Burns clearly stated that his purpose was more political and moral
than concerned with establishing a legal rule. He stated, after the
obligatory reference to the Louisiana lottery scandals:
Now, I don't think where an amendment is not going to change
anything, it's not going to add anything on to the present law,
it's not going to put any further restrictions over and above what
we already have and as I say we're people that like horse racing,
they're enjoying horse racing, they're enjoying pari-mutuel bet-
ting. The people that like bingo games are enjoying them, so why
by the actions of this committee, or this convention, especially
with reference to the lottery article; why do we want to go out
of our way and invite the open and active opposition of that large
percentage of the citizens of this state who are absolutely, definite-
ly opposed to lottery, that just as sure as we do it, we're going
to get that opposition and I'm not saying that as a threat because
they have documents here to show their sentiment?'
But Delegate Burns knew that his proposal did not define gambling
and that it was up to the legislature to do so. He said, "[T]his is not
going to change one thing that we don't have at the present time
except that it will keep it in the constitution and satisfy the voters
138. Delegate Proposal No. 17 at IV RECORDS: CONVENTION INSTRUMENTS 299. See
IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Jan. 8, 1974 at 3211-12, for the reading of the
proposal.
139. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Jan. 8, 1974 at 3213.
140. Planchard admitted, for example, that while off-track betting would be con-
sidered a form of lottery, bingo would not. Id. at 3212.
141. Id. at 3214.
1983]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
when they go to the polls to vote on this constitution." '142 Delegate
Smith supported the proposal and emphasized the political value of
the provision in North Louisiana:
Well, I'm not an expert on the definition of gambling, but I know
that we should put this in-whether you're from North Louisiana
or South Louisiana-our people feel very strongly about this up
in our area and this is one of the things they want in there. So,
gentlemen, I feel like we're going to hurt ourselves if we don't
put this in our constitution.143
Some younger lawyer delegates were more explicit. Delegate Fayard
said: "If you think that it's politically expedient and it's necessary
to adopt this to pass this constitution, I can see the reason why you
would vote this way. But, don't get up here and say it does anything;
it does nothing . .. ."'" Delegate Jenkins referred to it as "simply
moralist preaching" and "hypocritical."' 45 Delegate Duval admitted it
was pragmatic:
So, I don't think it will have any material effect on the operation
of the state. I think it's a purely pragmatic matter; it may facilitate
the passage of this document . . . Therefore, for a purely
pragmatic reason, because it does not change the law at all,
because we will operate as we always have been operating, I urge
that we adopt the amendment.'46
He was even more succinct: "I don't want to intellectually defend this
thing now; it's purely politically [sic]."' 7
In any event, a combination of pragmatists and moralists adopted
the Burns amendment and restored the language proclaiming gam-
bling a vice. Worn out at the end of the day, the delegates also quickly
adopted an amendment by Delegate Velasquez (a "have your cake and
eat it too' amendment) that added that if gambling activities do exist,
"they shall be taxed."'1
48
The next day, Delegate Gravel proposed a compromise provision
that was more straightforward in that it omitted the moral condemna-
tion of gambling as a vice and simply stated: "Neither the state nor
any of its political subdivisions shall conduct a lottery. Commercial
gambling shall be defined by and prohibited by the legislature."'4 9
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 3216.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 3217.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 3217-19.
149. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Jan. 9, 1974 at 3227.
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When confusion developed over the meaning of "commercial," that
word was dropped. An amendment was then adopted to use "sup-
pressed" rather than "prohibited" to continue the existing jurispru-
dence under the old word choice."5 An amendment by Delegate Nunez
to add that nothing in the constitution should be construed to pro-
hibit gambling by "charitable, benevolent, civic or religious" organiza-
tions was also defeated.' 5'
Article XII, section 6 and many other provisions demonstrate that
the constitution is a political document, a statement of aspirations by
some people, a type of sermon. Some provisions are not binding legal
rules that compel or prohibit certain conduct. Such provisions exist
for political reasons, and they should not be the basis for courts
establishing constitutional doctrine and constitutional limitations.
The legislature has defined gambling in terms of activities con-
ducted as a business, thus excluding nonbusiness gambling activities.52
This has been held to be a preemption of the field, prohibiting local
governments to go beyond the state statute and make nonbusiness
gambling criminal."' The precise definition of "lottery" is still uncer-
tain, and it could come into question if a municipality or the state
attempted to sponsor certain activities. Delegate Planchard did ad-
mit that a municipality could sponsor a poker tournament, but he also
suggested that off-track betting would be a "form of lottery that you
sell the lottery tickets for."" However, the mere sale of tickets is
hardly within the traditional definition of "lottery"; neither is pari-
mutuel betting. Under court construction of the 1921 constitutional
prohibition of lotteries, pari-mutuel betting was not a lottery, and it
would seem that continuation of the old rule in this respect was a
purpose of the new provision. In bingo, one puts up money for a chance
to win something, thus perhaps meeting the definition of lottery.
However, the idea that church bingo is not prohibited runs through-
out the debate. Perhaps the most certain approach is to recognize
that the prohibition has two primary roots: (1) antipathy toward the
Louisiana Lottery Company and the current expansion of state lot-
teries in the eastern United States, and (2) the desire to allow other
forms of gambling if the legislature so provides. The constitution does
have independent force in this respect, for if something is a lottery,
the legislature cannot otherwise define it and allow the state or a
governmental agency to conduct it.
150. Id. at 3233. See also id. at 3229-30.
151. Id. at 3230, 3233.
152. LA. R.S. 14:90 (Supp. 1979). See also LA. R.S. 14:90.1-90.2 (Supp. 1979).
153. City of Shreveport v. Kaufman, 353 So. 2d 995 (La. 1977).




ARTICLE XII, SECTION 4
Article XII, section 4 provides that "the right of the people to
preserve, foster, and promote their respective historic linguistic and
cultural origins is recognized." An initial problem is the impact of
the statement that a right of the people is "recognized." In other sec-
tions of the constitution, rights were established1" or prohibitions were
adopted." It seems anomalous then to use an ambiguous word for-
mula and state that a right "is recognized." This imprecise language
results from the fact that section 4 was a floor amendment adopted
during the last hectic days of the convention. A realistic analysis of
the concept behind the proposal would suggest that some right was
sought to be established, and it would be overly cynical to simply
"recognize" a "right" as a statement of aspirations and hope and not
as a binding rule. Although the section resulted from a floor amend-
ment, it does have a long legislative history in the Committee on Bill
of Rights and Elections, which first adopted and then rejected a similar
proposal.
Proponents of the section were primarily Francophones concerned
with the protection of the French Acadian culture. Representatives
of the Council for the Development of French in Louisiana appeared
before the committee several times to urge some recognition of
cultural rights, and delegates from Lafayette and Lake Charles worked
strongly for the proposal."' Although the ultimate wording is much
broader and although one staff research memorandum suggested that
preservation of black culture would also be protected by such a pro-
posal, the preservation of French culture was the driving force."'
An early proposal by Delegate Weiss discloses a concern for
language preservation:
.People within the state having a distinct language or culture
155. E.g., LA. CONST. art. I, S 4: "Every person has a right to acquire.., property."
156. E.g., LA. CONST. art. I, S 9: "No law shall impair the right of any person to assem-
ble peaceably ...."
157. See Committee Proposal No. 35 at IV RECORDS: CONVENTION INSTRUMENTS 268
(no reference was made to cultural rights); IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Jan.
4, 1974 at 3099-3100 (Delegate Corne's amendment was adopted); Committee on Bill
of Rights and Elections (CBRE) Staff Memo No. 31, May 2, 1973 at X RECORDS: COM-
MITTEE DOCUMENTS 110. Several attempts to place a cultural rights provision in the Bill
of Rights draft were made. See X RECORDS: COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, June 14, 1973 at
18, 71.
158. See CBRE Staff Memo No. 31, May 2, 1973 at X RECORDS: COMMITTEE
DOCUMENTS 110.
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have the right to conserve the same. This includes the right of
the people of a political subdivision to use the language or
languages of their choice in their local schools and other public
institutions. Private schools are free to teach in any language.' 9
While supporters sought to assure that adoption "would not mean
the wholesale replacement of English by French in the parishes of
Acadiana,"'' there was some uncertainty about the reference to in-
struction in schools. As a result, the last two sentences were deleted
in committee, and the proposal read simply, "[p]eople within the state
having a distinct language or culture have the right to conserve the
same." This cryptic language was criticized because, "[tihe inherent
ambiguity in the terms 'distinct language or culture' would leave so
much flexibility to court construction that the right guaranteed here
[might] indeed be a hollow one."'"' Rather than attempt to make the
language more precise, the committee simply voted to delete all
reference to the subject.'
The matter seemed to have been dropped. Then Delegate Corne,
a nonlawyer from Lafayette, introduced her amendment during the
closing days of the convention. It passed by a 95-1 vote. In explaining
her proposal, the author spoke in terms of encouraging bilingualism:
I really don't believe that it would give us a right to do anything
that we don't want to do now. However, it would be an encourage-
ment to preserve that which we tried once before to almost
eliminate in the State of Louisiana and it would then be an en-
couragement for the people not to attempt this again.' 3
Nevertheless, the language that was adopted is more than encourage-
ment. It "recognizes" the "right" of the people to "preserve, foster
and promote their respective historic linguistic and cultural origins."
At issue are the rather ethereal questions of defining linguistic origins
and cultural origins, as well as focusing on the conduct that is within
the concepts of preserving, fostering, and promoting. The convention
records clearly suggest that preserving a language is involved and
that Francophones should be able to preserve their language and ad-
vance it. However, this has been a federally recognized right since
159. CBRE Tentative Proposal No. 98, May 5, 1973 at X RECORDS: COMMITTEE
DOCUMENTS 61.
160. CBRE Staff Memo No. 31, May 2, 1973 at X RECORDS: COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS
110.
161. CBRE Staff Memo No. 46, June 7, 1973 at X RECORDS: COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS
125.
162. CBRE Tentative Proposal No. 164, June 14, 1973 at X RECORDS: COMMITTEE
DOCUMENTS 71.
163. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Jan. 4, 1974 at 3100.
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Meyer v. Nebraska."4 The development of the proposal indicates there
hardly would be a right to have the public schools teach that language.
At best, this provision might be seen as a particularization of those
principles protecting the rights of association that have been grafted
onto the first amendment, encompassing a right to unite and associate
for promotion of certain values and causes. The freedom of thought
and expression here involved become close analogues to those federal
rights.'65
In any event, a direct power is granted to the courts, for the sec-
tion is more than an aphorism or appeal to the legislature to act. It
is within the scope of the courts to develop and define the terms used,
in light of the convention purposes, and develop the scope of the rights
to be protected. However, as with its first amendment cousin, it is
unlikely that the section would be invoked to protect all cultural
origins, such as allowing a member of the Thugs who emigrated to
Louisiana to foster his origins by committing ritualistic robbery and
murder. 6 The rights covered by the section are vague ones that can
be balanced against other interests. Such a narrow construction would
be supported at least by the author's stated intent to encourage bi-
lingualism rather than make a drastic innovation.
MEETINGS AND RECORDS
ARTICLE XII, SECTION 3
The Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections proposed article
XII, section 3, which gives all persons "the right to observe the
deliberations of public bodies and examine public documents, except
in cases established by law." '167 This noncontroversial section was
adopted with no debate by a vote of 104-6, it being understood that
the exception clause therein makes the "right" subject to legislative
control. The sponsor admitted that the section established only the
presumption of access and that "[olur statutes presently spell out which
cases are denied."' 6
8
Here again, the subject is under legislative control, and the con-
stitutional provision is merely a precatory admonition. If the
legislature were to repeal the existing laws that make exceptions to
164. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
165. "[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment,
contract the spectrum of available knowledge." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
482 (1965). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 904 (1978).
166. See the discussion of the ritualistic Thugs in W. COHEN & J. KAPLAN, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 417 (2d ed. 1982).
167. Committee Proposal No. 35, 5 4 at IV RECORDS: CONVENTION INSTRUMENTS 268.
168. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Jan. 3, 1974 at 3073.
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open meetings and records, the definitions of "public bodies" and
"public documents" would become an issue. In this regard, the con-
vention records provide little guidance.
It should be clear, however, that the ambit of section 3 excludes
the legislature. While the House and the Senate are without doubt
public bodies, they are regulated by the more specific requirements
of article III, section 15. That section requires that action by the House
and Senate on any matter intended to have the effect of law shall
be taken only in open, public meeting. It is also necessary that there
be three separate "readings" of a bill in each house before passage.
This device provides some delay for making information about the
proposed bills available and prevents "quickie" passage of bills. There
also must be a public hearing by a committee and a committee report
before passage of a bill. These constitutional requirements are more
specific than article XII, section 3 and cannot be abolished by law,
as would be permitted if section 3 governed.
The rights of public access under section 3 do exist if the
legislature does not provide otherwise. In such a case, section 3 does
not provide a sanction for failure to recognize the right. On the other
hand, section 15(A) makes clear that an action will not have "the ef-
fect of law" if it is not taken in open, public meeting. Prior practice
also suggests that a lack of three readings will result in nullity. The
close connection of these provisions with the public committee hear-
ing and report also suggests that the failure to provide the hearing
and report will result in nullity.
With respect to inspection of documents, a logical remedy is to
order that inspection be allowed. But if a meeting was held at which
action was taken, should that action be nullified? The history of sec-
tion 3 does not specify, and, presumably, the existing state legisla-
tion that makes exceptions to open meetings governs as long as that
legislation remains in effect. If that legislation were repealed, it would
appear then that the courts would be able to devise the appropriate
means of enforcing this right to have open meetings, and if less radical
means are not sufficient, there would seem to be no prohibition against
making actions then taken null.'69
It should also be clear that the right is to "observe" the delibera-
tions of public bodies, not to participate or take part in the meetings.
In addition, the ambit of the right extends beyond what may be called
meetings and includes "deliberations," which would include nonmeetings
where such deliberations may occur.
169. See Comment, Entering the Door Opened: An Evolution of Rights of Public Access
to Governmental Deliberations in Louisiana and a Plea For Realistic Remedies, 41 LA.
L. REV. 192 (1980).
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. CODES
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 10 AND ARTICLE XII, SECTION 14
Two provisions originating in floor amendments by Delegate
Singleterry require codification and publication of ordinances and
agency regulations. Article VI, section 10 requires the governing
authority of a political subdivision to "have a code prepared contain-
ing all of its general ordinances" and to make the code generally
available to the public. It also requires that "all general ordinances
adopted after the approval of the code shall be amendments or addi-
tions to the code." Article XII, section 14 provides that any rules,
regulations, and procedures adopted by state agencies, commissions,
and boards "shall be published in one or more codes and made
available to the public."
Both proposals were approved by wide margins (108-5 and 86-0)
with little debate. The debate on section 14 occupies but five lines
in the convention record, and the only opposition to section 10 related
to whether the rule should have been constitutionalized or left to the
legislature.7 ' The purpose of the provisions was to make local laws
and agency rules more accessible:
This section is intended to ease a gigantic problem -the problem
of knowing what the local law is. . . .In my area, I must make
a sixty mile round trip to the courthouse and look in the minute
entries of the meetings of the police jury to find a police jury
ordinance. If we are going to give local government more lawmak-
ing power, then local government should, also, have the additional
obligation to put that law into a form that people can get their
hands on and read so that they will know what law they are sub-
ject to.'7'
The provisions do not expressly prevent a fee being charged to
obtain copies,'72 and the author suggested that "if this code were mere-
ly xeroxed, pages of the ordinances held together by a staple, I believe
this would be in compliance with the section."'73 It is clear that
coverage extends to "all" agencies, boards, and commissions in the
case of section 14 and to "each political subdivision" in the case of
section 10. It is also true that the rules do not apply to statutes
adopted by the legislature. Indeed, section 14 does not expressly re-
quire agencies to adopt rules or procedure. It simply requires that
170. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Jan. 4, 1974 at 3099; VII RECORDS: CON-
VENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Sept. 27, 1973 at 1465-66.
171. VII RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Sept. 27, 1973 at 1465.
172. Accord id. at 1465-66.
173. Id. at 1465.
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those rules, regulations, or procedures that are adopted be published
in one or more codes and made available to the public. On the other
hand, the governing bodies of political subdivisions were required to
codify, within two years of the effective date of the constitution (by
January 1, 1977), all of their general ordinances. All subsequent general
ordinances had to be amendments or additions to the code.
A threshold problem is the meaning of the term "code" in this
context. It would be unrealistic to think of agency rules and procedures
or local ordinances as being the material from which sophisticated,
systematic codes in the traditional continental perspective are made.
In light of the purpose behind making the ordinances and regulations
accessible, the reference is more logically one to an arrangement of
rules or ordinances by subject matter in a logical fashion-as titles
in the Louisiana Revised. Statutes or in the then existing city codes." 4
A more serious problem relates to the enforcement of these sec-
tions. No doubt, a mandamus remedy is available, since the obliga-
tions imposed are mandatory rather than discretionary and do not
require implementing legislation to make them effective.
More difficult, however, is the issue of whether the relevant
regulations or ordinances are effective if not organized into a code
and published. The constitution does not specifically make them inef-
fective, although it is arguable that failing to comply with these
publication requirements is a violation of the constitution itself, the
sanction for which ought to be nullity.'75
One approach that limits the problem is the scope given to the
definition of "code." If a loose standard is adopted, the fact that rules
or ordinances are organized into similar subject matter titles may be
sufficient. That approach would be consistent with the purpose of mak-
ing law available to the public in a readily usable form.
Another step in the analysis of the ordinance requirement is the
fact that only "all of its general ordinances" have to be codified, and
only "all general ordinances adopted after the approval of the code"
are covered by the "amendments or additions" category. However,
only a rather small category of rules would not qualify as a "general
ordinance." Perhaps a rule of internal management would not qualify
174. References to the availability of the codes of Baton Rouge, New Orleans, and
Shreveport would suggest that the loose topical arrangement of those codes would
be sufficient. Id.
175. With respect to publication, the problem does not exist because of other state
laws that require publication before effectiveness-in the state register in the case
of state agency rules, LA. R.S. 49:954.1 (Supp. 1974), or in the official journal in the case
of local governing authorities, LA. R.S. 33:406 (1950). But what of the requirement that
they be made into codes?
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as one, but if a rule purports to have the effect of law on the general
population, it would seem to be a general ordinance.
The purpose of these two sections would be seriously undermined
if unorganized enactments not qualifying as codes were to be given
effect. Forcing citizens to make a difficult search of agency records
or minutes to find a rule causes the exact problems that the author
of the provisions sought to avoid. Failure to make such ordinances
null would be tantamount to ignoring the provisions, for no other ef-
fective sanction exists.
In a larger sense, the net impact of these sections is to fill the
gaps in the laws governing promulgation of local ordinances and agen-
cy regulations.' Absent a general constitutional rule on this subject,
these sections require publication, with the implication that lack of
publication makes them ineffective. In addition, they require organiza-
tion of the laws into a form that is readily accessible to the people.
If laws are not in that form, the defect is akin to a lack of promulga-
tion and should be so treated, resulting in nullity.
CAPITAL
ARTICLE XII, SECTION 1
"The capital of Louisiana is the city of Baton Rouge." Article XII,
section 1 so provides. Indeed, the legislation calling the convention
purported to forbid a change in the capital's location,177 even though,
as one might expect, there was no attempt to change the capital. Yet,
the supreme court does not sit in Baton Rouge-it is located in New
Orleans. That was so under the 1921 constitution, and the deletion
of the requirement that the court sit in New Orleans did not purport
to require it to move to Baton Rouge.'78 So, there once again exists
a provision that makes one city the capital, but it doesn't require all
government or even the most important arms of government to be
domiciled there.
176. LA. CONST. art. III, S 19; LA. CIv. CODE arts. 4-7; LA. R.S. 24:173 (1950); LA. R.S.
43:24 (1950 & Supp. 1975); LA. R.S. 43:81 (1950 & Supp. 1975).
177. 1972 La. Acts, No. 2, S 4.
178. LA. CONST. of 1921 art. 7, S 4. Although Draft A submitted by Judge Tate (a
Judiciary Department delegate) first included the domicile provisions, XI RECORDS:
COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS 346, the provision was not carried forward into the committee
proposal, Committee Proposal No. 6 at IV RECORDS: CONVENTION INSTRUMENTS 42,
primarily for reasons of brevity and flexibility. See XI RECORDS: COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS,
Apr. 20, 1973 at 249.
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NATURAL RESOURCES
ARTICLE IX
As article IX, section 1 indicates by its title (Natural Resources
and Environment; Public Policy), the section is a statement of policy
with a nonbinding mandate that the legislature "shall enact laws to
implement this policy." Committee comments indicated the provision
would have no self-executing force. The chairman of the Natural
Resources Committee introduced the proposal as a compromise under
which one could not force the legislature to do anything, as the extent
of protection was a matter that the legislature "in its wisdom" would
decide. 79
Natural Gas-Article IX, Section 2
While article IX, section 2(A) does make a perfunctory statement
about natural gas being "affected with a public interest," the main
impact of the section is to allow the legislature to establish any
regulatory authority it chooses to regulate natural gas. The Public
Service Commission has no right to regulate natural gas. The Natural
Resources Committee had proposed to allocate that power to the Com-
mission, but a floor amendment was readily adopted to conform the
proposal to legislation that had just been adopted during a special
session of the legislature.
1 80
Section 2(B) does purport to prohibit the connection of an in-
trastate gas pipeline with an interstate pipeline without approval of
some state agency to be established by law. This section reflects an
attempt to keep natural gas from being shipped out of the state and
thus subject to federal price regulation under the then existing federal
statutes. It was basically ineffective as a means of accomplishing its
purpose, for any attempts to keep the privately owned product out
of interstate commerce would be a violation of federal constitutional
law, as has been recognized in Tenneco, Inc. v. Sutton."'
179. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 18, 1973 at 2913.
180. IX RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 18, 1973 at 2920.
181. 530 F. Supp. 411 (M.D. La. 1981).
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